ABELLA v. NLRC

G.R. No. 71813 July 20, 1987, PARAS, J.

(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of labor Laws)

FACTS

PETITIONER Abella leased a farmland from Ramona for a period of 10 years and renewable for another 10 years at the option of the former. Abella hired the private respondents Quitco and Dionele. Abella renewed the lease for another ten years. At the expiration of the lease, she dismissed both private respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners. Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner. for overtime pay, reinstatement, and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal was warranted  by the cessation of business, but the respondents are entitled to separation pay, invoking Art. 284 of the Labor Code, as amended.

ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay.

RULING

The Court upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that  Article 284 is the applicable law in this case. Art 284, as amended refers to employment benefits to farm hands who were not parties to petitioner's lease contract with the owner of Hacienda Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have the effect of annulling subsequent legislation designed to protect the interest of the working class.
It is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. It is the kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.

Meralco v. NLRC

G.R. No. 78763 July 12,1989, MEDIALDEA, J.

(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of labor Laws)

FACTS

Private resondent, Apolinario Signo was dismissed from work by Meralco when it was found out that he breached the trust of thpe company by making it appear that the residence of one applicant for an electric service is within the serviceable area of MEralco. The applicant’s residence was installed with electrical services thru Signo’s maneuver, however, due to the fault of the Power sales division, the applicant-consumer was not billed for a year.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the dismissal of Signo was a proper penalty for his acts.

RULING

The Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in finding that Dismissal was a drastic measure considering the length of service of to the Company by Signo, which is 20 years, and the 2 awards he received for honesty from the employer. He was ordered reinstated, thought without backwages for he is not at all faultless.

 Further, it was held that in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor"

IBAAEU v. Inciong

G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984, Makasiar, J.

(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of Labor Laws)

FACTS

The Secretary of Labor, issued Policy no. 9 interpreting article 94 of Labor Code as regards Right to Holiday pay, stated among others, that PD 850 principally intended to benefit daily-paid workers. Those who are paid by the month, i.e., he is paid uniformly from January to December is presumed to have been paid with legal holidays, unless his salary is deducted for the month the holiday occurs. Invoking this Policy, the Bank stopped paying its employees for the legal holidays.

ISSUE

Whether or not, PD 850 was intended only for daily wage workers.

RULING

“It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORP v. CA

G.R .144664, MARCH 15 2004, CARPIO-MORALES, J

(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of Labor laws)

FACTS: 

DOLE issued an Explanatory bulletin entitling workers to be paid 200% of the bASIC pay on April 9, 1998, whether unworked, as the date falls on 2 holidays Maundy Thursday and araw ng kagitingan, Petitioner, notwithstanding the Explanatory bulletin paid their workers only 100% of their basic pay. They assailed the constitutionality of the Explanatory bulletin.

RULING:

“Holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive.

It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, there is nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the entitlement to ten days of holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidays fall on the same day.”

PASEI v. Drilon

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.

(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)

FACTS:

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

RULING:

 “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."  As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"  but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution  does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.

PEOPLE v. POMAR

November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.

(Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation)

FACTS:

Julio Pomar is the manager and person  in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the City of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo.

The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or place of labor of any description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery.

ISSUE: 

Whether  or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

RULING:

The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people’s law – the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.

It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.

Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed.