PEOPLE v. POMAR

November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.

(Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation)

FACTS:

Julio Pomar is the manager and person  in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the City of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo.

The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or place of labor of any description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery.

ISSUE: 

Whether  or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

RULING:

The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people’s law – the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.

It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.

Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed.